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sites to give effect to the intent of Title VII merit application of equitable
tolling in this case. Chappell represents a rather stiff application of filing
technicalities that promotes unfairness and confusion in the jurisdictional
prerequisite debate and should, therefore, be reconsidered.
Thomas McKenzie

CRIMINAL LAW-Defenses-nvoluntary Intoxication
Is a Defense in Texas
Torres v. State,
585 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
Helen Torres and Robert Miranda broke into a home and forced the
owner, Margaret Garcia, at gunpoint to load everything of value into her
car. She was then ordered to cash two checks at her bank. When the
drive-in teller refused to cash the checks for lack of identification, Mrs.
Garcia was allowed to go inside the bank to cash the checks. Once inside
the bank Mrs. Garcia notified the police, and Torres and Miranda were
arrested within a short time. Torres was charged with aggravated robbery,
and at the trial her accomplice, Miranda, was the sole defense witness. He
testified that a few hours prior to the robbery he gave Torres a drink
containing water, Alka-Seltzer, and four or five 250 mg. Thorazine1 tablets. Torres was unaware of the Thorazine in the drink. The victim testified both Torres and Miranda appeared to be drugged at the time of the
robbery, and other testimony indicated Torres was found asleep in the
victim's car when police arrived on the scene. A jury charge based on the
defense of involuntary intoxication was requested by Torres but was refused by the trial court.2 Torres was convicted and appealed to the Court
of Criminal Appeals. Held-Reversed and remanded. Involuntary intoxication is a defense in Texas.8
Intoxication' has never been a favored defense in the common law. A

1. Thorazine is a brand name for the generic drug chlorpromazine. It is used as a tranquilizer and sedative. Normal adult dosage levels are between 10 and 50 mgs., although for
acutely agitated psychiatric patients dosages of 1000 mgs. per day may be used. PHYSICIAN'S
DESK REFERENCE

1632-34 (33d ed. 1979).

2. Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The requested charge
directed an acquittal if the jury found defendant was involuntarily intoxicated and as a
result of such intoxication did not act voluntarily in committing the crime. Id. at 748.
3. Id. at 749.
4. See Tex. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(d) (Vernon 1974). Section 8.04(d) defines intoxication as a "disturbance of mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any
substance into the body." Id.; see Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex. Crim. App.
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few early trial courts even considered intoxication as an aggravating fac-

tor enhancing criminal liability, but such findings were held to be improper on appeal. Most courts, relying on moral and practical arguments 7 followed the general rule that intoxication was no defense.9
Society was unwilling to permit a condition that most people considered a
crime, 9 a sin,10 or at best a personal weakness, " to serve as an excuse for
the commission of criminal acts." As a practical matter, since intoxica-

tion was an easily acquired condition, allowing it as a defense would only

increase its prevalence.18
In limited circumstances, however, intoxication has been recognized as

1975).
5. See, e.g., State v. Sopher, 30 N.W. 917, 918 (Iowa 1886) (intoxication looked upon
with disfavor by court); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 S.E. 673, 677 (Va. 1923) (intoxication as defense is dangerous, subject to abuse, and must be carefully guarded); State v.
Mriglot, 550 P.2d 17, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (intoxication an unfavored defense). "This
vice doth deprive men of the use of reason, and puts many men into a perfect, but temporary, phrensy; ... such a person shall have no privilege by his voluntary contracted madness, but shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right senses." Colbath v. State, 4

Jackson & J. 76, 78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1878) (quoting 1 HALE,
(1778)).

HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE

CROWN

6. See, e.g., McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 514, 520-21 (1865); People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9,
12, 20-21 (1858); Ferrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503, 507-08 (1875). Courts reasoned it was bad
enough to commit a crime, but worse for a person to voluntarily put himself in a mental
state that made commission of a crime more likely. See People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9, 18
(1858); Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500, 506 (1854).
7. See Kendall v. State, 145 So. 2d 924, 925 (Miss. 1962); Colbath v. State, 4 Jackson &
J. 76, 78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1878).
8. See, e.g., People v. Murray, 56 Cal. Rptr. 21, 23 (Ct. App. 1967) (voluntary intoxication no defense); State v. Harden, 480 P.2d 53, 60-61 (Kan. 1971) ("temporary loss of one's
physical and mental faculties due to voluntary intoxication is not equivalent to an excuse
for criminal liability"); City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 283 N.W.2d 851, 855 (Minn. 1976)
(voluntary intoxication never a defense at common law).
9. See State v. Brown, 16 P. 259, 259 (Kan. 1888) (drunkenness a misdemeanor); People
v. Townsend, 183 N.W. 177, 179 (Mich. 1921) (by statute, drunkards are disorderly persons).
10. See State v. Sopher, 30 N.W. 917, 918 (Iowa 1886) (actions forbidden by the laws of
God); Kendall v. State, 145 So. 2d 924, 925 (Miss. 1962) (moral duty to abstain from becoming intoxicated).
11. See-People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9, 18 (1858) (a vice that compromises man's duty to
society); Colbath v. State, 4 Jackson & J. 76, 78-79 (Tex. Ct. App. 1878) (intoxication was
defendant's "own act and folly" and "his own gross vice and misconduct").
12. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 S.E. 673, 676-77 (Va. 1923).
13. See Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029, 1035 (Ariz. 1931) (doctrine of intoxication as a
defense is dangerous and liable to be abused). "There would be no security for life or property if men could commit crimes with impunity, provided they would first make themselves
drunk enough to cease to be reasonable beings." Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 500, 506 (1854);
accord, State v. Arsenault, 124 A.2d 741, 746 (Me. 1956); Kendall v. State, 145 So. 2d 924,
925 (Miss. 1962).
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indirectly removing criminal responsibility.1" If chronic intoxication produces a long term mental disease or dysfunction, a defendant can plead
the defense of insanity.1" The general rule against intoxication as a defense is not contradicted, but rather avoided since the critical factor is
mental disease, not intoxication.1" As an ameliorating condition intoxication is treated in two ways.1 7 For crimes requiring a culpable mental state
or specific intent, intoxication can be used to show the defendant was
incapable of forming the requisite mental state."8 Courts also can treat
intoxication as having no effect on the guilt or innocence of the accused
but as a mitigating factor in the sentencing phase of the trial.1 9
Involuntary intoxication is the one recognized exception to the general
rule that intoxication is no defense.2 The defense of involuntary intoxication, however, is looked upon with suspicion. 2' As a result, many jurisdic-

14. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 241 A.2d 185, 188 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968); Commonwealth v. McAlister, 313 N.E.2d 113, 119 (Mass. 1974); State v. Salmon, 226 N.E.2d 784, 787
(Ohio Ct. App. 1967).
15. See, e.g., Easter v. District of Columbia, 209 A.2d 625, 627 (D.C. 1965) (permanent
mental disease resulting from extended habit of intemperance treated same as other types
of insanity); State v. Booth, 169 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa 1969) (brain damage from extensive
use of alcohol treated as insanity); State v. Plummer, 374 A.2d 431, 436 (N.H. 1977) (chronic
alcoholism resulting in mental disease is grounds for insanity defense).
16. See State v. Booth, 169 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Iowa, 1969); State v. Plummer, 374 A.2d
431, 435-36 (N.H. 1977).
17. Compare State v. Seely, 510 P.2d 115, 121-22 (Kan. 1973) (intoxication may be a
defense to crimes requiring specific intent) with Hart v. State, 537 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976) (intoxication may mitigate penalty).
18. See, e.g., State v. Lentz, 306 So. 2d 683, 685 (La. 1975) (burglary: unauthorized
entering of premises with intent to commit a felony or theft); State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140,
143 n.1 (Me. 1977) (robbery: must find intent to deprive victim permanently of his property); Perryman v. State, 159 P. 937, 938 (Okla. Crim. App. 1916) (murder: must find capability of forming and entertaining premeditated design). A defendant could still be convicted of a lesser offense that did not require specific intent. See State v. Bunn, 196 S.E.2d
777, 786 (N.C. 1973) (murder charge reduced from first to second degree); Ameen v. State,
186 N.W.2d 206, 212 (Wis. 1971) (lacking specific intent, first degree murder reduced to
second degree murder).
19. See Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Tx. PENA CODE
ANN. § 8.04(b) (Vernon 1974). In Texas the defendant must prove the intoxication resulted
in temporary insanity under section 8.01 of the Penal Code in order to get a jury charge on
mitigation of punishment. Hart v. State, 537 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
20. See, e.g., State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 145 (Me. 1977); Colbath v. State, 4 Jackson &
J. 76, 78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1878); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 S.E. 673, 676 (Va. 1923). "[I]f
a person by the unskilfulness of his physician, or by the contrivance of his enemies, eat or
drink such a thing as causeth such a temporary or permanent phreny, . . . this puts him
into the same condition, in reference to crimes, as any other phrenzy, and equally excuseth
him." City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 855 (Minn. 1976) (quoting 1 HALE,
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 32 (1778)).
21. See, e.g., Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029, 1035 (Ariz. 1931) (defense is dangerous and
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tions recognizing the defense have expressly or implicitly made involuntary intoxication an affirmative defense22 requiring the defendant to
assume the burden of raising the issue and of proving it. 2 There are two
elements to the defense of involuntary intoxication, involuntariness 24 and
a resultant mental condition equivalent to insanity at the time of the
criminal act.25 Involuntariness in early common law was considered a lack

of knowledge on the part of the person taking the intoxicant. 26 Early deci-

sions in this country continued this emphasis, but also referred to force
and coercion as factors showing involuntariness.2 Under the broad head-

likely to be abused); City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 858 (Minn. 1976) (an
unusual condition that will rarely be appropriate as a defense); Johnson v. Commonwealth,
115 S.E. 673, 676 (Va. 1923) (defense rarely allowed and under strict limitations).
22. An affirmative defense imposes a heavier burden of proof on the defendant than
does a defense. In Texas the defendant must prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of evidence; but need only raise a reasonable doubt as to a defense. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. §§ 2.03(d), 2.04(d) (Vernon 1974).
23. See City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 858 (Minn. 1976) (defendant
must establish the defense); Staples v. State, 245 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Wis. 1976) (defendant
has burden of proof on both involuntariness and state of mind); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 63(b), 6-4 (Smith-Hurd 1972). But see State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 145 (Me. 1977) ("the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of involuntary intoxication"). The
United States Supreme Court has held that placing the burden of proving a defense on a
defendant, whether the test is beyond a reasonable doubt or a preponderance of the evidence, does not violate the constitutional right of due process. See Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790, 798-99 (1952).
24. See, e.g., Easter v. District of Columbia, 209 A.2d 625, 627 (D.C. 1965) (intoxication
without person's consent); State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 145 (Me. 1977) (intoxication not selfinduced); Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (no independent
judgment or volition in taking the intoxicant).
25. See, e.g., Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029, 1035 (Ariz. 1931) (defendant "does not
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his act"); State v. Mriglot, 550
P.2d 17, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (defendant unable to perceive the "nature and quality of
the act"); Staples v. State, 245 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Wis. 1976) (defendant "incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong").
26. See, e.g., McCook v. State, 17 S.E. 1019, 1019 (Ga. 1893) (intoxication by fraud,
artifice, or contrivance); Choate v. State, 197 P. 1060, 1063 (Okla. Crim. App. 1921) (involuntary intoxication means by design, fraud, or artifice of another); Pearson's Case, 168 Eng.
Rep. 1108, 1108 (1835) (involuntary if by strategem or fraud of another). In some cases, the
defendant drank something without knowing someone else had put an intoxicant in the
drink. See Pribble v. People, 112 P. 220, 221 (Colo. 1910) (drug administered without the
knowledge of defendant); State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 147-48 (Me. 1977) (LSD put in defendant's beer). In other cases the person took something knowing what it was but being unaware the substance had intoxicating properties. See, e.g., Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284
S.W.2d 654, 658 (Ky. 1955) (intoxication from medical treatment by physician); City of
Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 856-57 (Minn. 1976) (unusual and unexpected reaction to prescription drug); People v. Koch, 294 N.Y.S. 987, 989 (App. Div. 1937) (inadvertent overdose of prescribed drug).
27. See, e.g., Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029, 1035 (Ariz. 1931) (duress or fraud); Barthol-
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ing of lack of knowledge, several specific types of involuntariness have
been recognized.2 8 Taking an intoxicant due to the fraud or deception of
another person has invariably been considered involuntary.20 Likewise,
intoxication resulting from a medically prescribed drug has been held involuntary. 0 The Model Penal Code includes pathological intoxication as
an affirmative defense, 1 but courts have been reluctant to adopt such a
provision. 2 .
Although force and duress are widely recognized as examples of involuntariness,"3 courts and writers have been unable to cite any decision
holding the evidence sufficient to support acquittal based on involuntary

intoxication by force. 8 Coercion is frequently raised by defendants who
contend they had no intention of drinking but drank at another's invitation because they feared the consequences of refusing the invitation.8s

omew v. People, 104 Ill. 601, 606 (1882) (fraud, contrivance, or force); Perryman v. State,
159 P. 937, 937-38 (Okla. Crim. App. 1916) (lack of knowledge or coercion).
28. See City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 856 (Minn. 1976).
29. See Pribble v. People, 112 P. 220, 221 (Colo. 1910) (drug administered without defendant's knowledge); People v. Penman, 110 N.E. 894, 900 (Il1. 1915) (defendant took cocaine tablet when told it was a breath freshener); cf. Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413, 416
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (when defendant suspected drug had been placed in his drink but
drank it anyway, held not involuntary).
30. See, e.g., Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Ky. 1955) (involuntary
when caused by medical treatment of physician); City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238
N.W.2d 851, 858 (Minn. 1976) (unexpected reaction to drug prescribed by physician); People v. Koch, 294 N.Y.S. 987, 989 (App. Div. 1937) (inadvertent overdose of drug prescribed
by physician). To apply the defense of involuntary intoxication, the defendant must not
have had knowledge of the drug's potential for causing intoxication. See Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 654, 658-59 (Ky. 1955); City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d
851, 857 (Minn. 1976).
31. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(4), (5)(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Pathological
intoxication is defined as "intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the
intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is susceptible." Id.
32. See, e.g., Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1968) (pathological
intoxication not recognized), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969); Martinez v. People, 235
P.2d 810, 815 (Colo. 1951) (court would allow defense only if plead as insanity); Thomas v.
State, 125 S.E.2d 679, 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962) (decreased tolerance to alcohol does not
decrease responsibility for criminal acts). But see People v. Castillo, 449 P.2d 449, 452, 74
Cal. Rptr. 385, 388 (1969) (evidence of diminished capacity due to pathological intoxication
should be submitted to jury); City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 858 (Minn.
1976) (unusual and unexpected reaction to drugs can be defense).
33. See, e.g., Easter v. District of Columbia, 209 A.2d 625, 627 (D.C. 1965); State v.
Plummer, 374 A.2d 431, 435 (N.H. 1977); State v. Bunn, 196 S.E.2d 777, 786 (N.C. 1973).
34. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 856 (Minn. 1976); State
v. Bunn, 196 S.E.2d 777, 786 (N.C. 1973); J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
539-40 (2d ed. 1960); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 895-96 (2d ed. 1969). See generally Annot.,
73 A.L.R.3d 195, 205-08 (1976).
35. See, e.g., Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029, 1035 (Ariz. 1931); Borland v. State, 249
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Courts have regularly found insufficient duress in this situation to justify
a claim of involuntariness.3 6 The use of actual force undoubtedly consti3 7

tutes involuntariness if the evidence is sufficient to support the claim.
Alcoholism and drug addiction are not considered involuntary states of
intoxication." While alcoholism or drug addiction may support a successful insanity defense,39 an irresistible impulse or compulsion to drink or
take drugs is insufficient to demonstrate a lack of volition;' 0 as a result,
courts have not allowed the defense of involuntary intoxication based on
alcoholism or addiction.4 '
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has defined the test for involuntariness as an "absence of an exercise of independent judgment and volition on the part of the accused in taking the intoxicant.'4 In stating this
definition, the court did not define independent judgment and volition or
discuss what fact situations might meet such a definition.43 The court's
holding was limited to a finding that knowingly taking an intoxicant did
not meet the test for involuntariness."
In addition to involuntariness, a defendant must also prove the intoxi-

S.W. 591, 594 (Ark. 1923); McCook v. State, 17 S.E. 1019, 1019 (Ga. 1893).
36. See, e.g., Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029, 1035 (Ariz. 1931) (amount of influence must
amount to duress); Borland v. State, 249 S.W. 591, 594 (Ark. 1923) (drinking at another's
request not coercion); Perryman v. State, 159 P. 937, 937-38 (Okla. Crim. App. 1916) (drinking liquor given by another not coercion).
37. See, e.g., Borland v. State, 249 S.W. 591, 594 (Ark. 1923); City of Minneapolis v.
Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 856 (Minn, 1976); State v. Bunn, 196 S.E.2d 777, 786 (N.C. 1973).
38. See, e.g., People v. Morrow, 74 Cal. Rptr. 551, 558 (Ct. App. 1969) (when alcoholic's
first drink is by choice, .intoxication is voluntary); State v. Palacio, 559 P.2d 804, 806 (Kan.
1977) (chronic alcoholism is not involuntary intoxication); State v. Crayton, 354 S.W.2d 834,
836-37 (Mo. 1962) (drug addiction not involuntary). But see Staples v. State, 245 N.W.2d
679, 683-84 (Wis. 1976) (alcoholism may raise issue of involuntary intoxication if proved by
expert medical testimony).
39. See, e.g., People v.Murray, 56 Cal. Rptr. 21, 23 (Ct.,App. 1967); Easter v. District of
Columbia, 209 A.2d 625, 627 (D.C. 1965); Colbath v. State, 4 Jackson &J. 76, 79 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1878). Drug addiction may also support an insanity plea. See Brand v. State, 180
S.E.2d 579, 580 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971); State v. Crayton, 354 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Mo. 1962).
.40. See, e.g., People v. Morrow, 74 Cal. Rptr. 551, 555-56 (Ct. App. 1969); Easter v.
District of Columbia, 209 A.2d 625, 627 (D.C. 1965); State v. Palacio, 559 P.2d 804, 806
(Kan. 1977).
41. See, e.g., People v. Morrow, 74 Cal. Rptr. 551, 555-56 (Ct. App. 1969); State v. Palacio, 559 P.2d 804, 806 (Kan. 1977); State v. Crayton, 354 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Mo. 1962).
42. Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
43. Id. at 416. Two other jurisdictions have used this definition but have also failed to
define the terms. See State v. Plummer, 374 A.2d 431, 435 (N.H. 1977); Johnson v.
Comonwealth, 115 S.E. 673, 677 (Va. 1923). Independent judgment and volition could be
paraphrased as comparing alternative courses of action and choosing one free of the influence of someone else. See WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1148, 1223, 2562 (3d
ed. 1963).
44. Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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cation resulted in a mental dysfunction equivalent to temporary insanity
at the time of the criminal act.45 Since the insanity defense is recognized
in all jurisdictions, many of the courts recognizing involuntary intoxication have simply adopted the same mental dysfunction test already used
for insanity. 6 In most jurisdictions this is the M'Naghten test, which
requires the defendant to prove, as a result of mental disease, an inability
at the time of the criminal act to know the nature of the act or to know
the act was wrong." The cause of the mental dysfunction is the only definitional difference between the defenses of insanity and involuntary intoxication."9 For the former, a mental disease or defect is required;50 for
the latter, involuntarily caused intoxication."
In Torres v. State 2 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had to determine if involuntary intoxication was a defense in Texas, what the applicable test should be if it was a defense, and if the evidence presented sufficiently raised the issue of involuntary intoxication."3 In holding
involuntary intoxication to be a valid defense, the court found the defense was recognized at common law and was consistent with the Texas
statutory defense of insanity.5 Relying on recent decisions from other ju-

45. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 857 (Minn. 1976) (defendant must be temporarily insane due to involuntary intoxication); State v. Mriglot, 550 P.2d
17, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (defense if temporary insanity is caused by truly involuntary
intoxication); Staples v. State, 245 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Wis. 1976) (degree of intoxication must
be such that defendant could not tell right from wrong).
46. See, e.g., People v. Murray, 56 Cal. Rptr. 21, 23 (Ct. App. 1967); City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 857 (Minn. 1976); State v. Mriglot, 550 P.2d 17, 18 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1976).
47. See, e.g., Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029, 1035 (Ariz. 1931) (defendant does not "understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his act"); State v. Mriglot, 550 P.2d
17, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (defendant must be unable to "perceive the nature and quality
of the act"); Staples v. State, 245 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Wis. 1976) (defendant must be incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong). In Texas a modification of M'Naghten is used to determine insanity: either the defendant did not know his conduct was wrong or he was incapable
of conforming his conduct to the law. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(a), comment
(Vernon 1974).
48. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 858-63 (2d ed. 1969).
49. See State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 146 (Me. 1977); City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238
N.W.2d 851, 857 (Minn. 1976).
50. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1972); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.14 (West 1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.15(1) (West 1971).
51. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-3(b) (Smith-Hurd 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 213208(1) (1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.42(1) (West 1958).
52. 585 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
53. Id. at 748-49.
54. Id. at 748-49. The court reasoned that if, under section 8.01(a) of the Texas Penal
Code, a mental disease or defect could remove criminal responsibility, involuntary intoxica-
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risdictions, 5 the Torres court concluded evidence of both involuntariness
and a resulting mental dysfunction must be affirmatively raised by the
57
defendant." The definition of involuntariness set out in Hanks v. State,
requiring an absence of independent judgment and volition, was followed
in Torres." The statutory test for mental dysfunction required for the
insanity defense was found equally applicable to involuntary intoxication.59 The court of criminal appeals determined the evidence put forward
by the defendant in Torres was sufficient to raise the two issues of involuntariness and subsequent mental dysfunction. Even though Torres voluntarily drank the mixture, there was evidence she had no knowledge of
its intoxicating contents and thus exercised no independent judgment in
taking the intoxicant. 61 Although the evidence of defendant's state of

tion causing a similar mental state should also be a defense. Id. at 748-49. The court thus
recognized a condition that previous decisions and the Penal Code only implicitly acknowledged as a possible excuse from criminal liability. See Colbath v. State, 4 Jackson & J. 76,
78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1878) (quoted Hale's statement that intoxication not the fault of the
accused is exception to the general rule that intoxication is no defense); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 8.04(a) (Vernon 1974). By stating voluntary intoxication is no defense, section 8.04(a)
implies involuntary intoxication may be a defense. See Bubany, The Texas Penal Code of
1974, 28 Sw. L.J. 292, 317-18 (1974).
55. See, e.g., People v. Murray, 56 Cal. Rptr. 21, 23 (Ct. App. 1967); City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 857 (Minn. 1976); State v. Mriglot, 550 P.2d 17, 18 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1976).
56. Torres v. State, 585 S.W. 2d 746, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The language used in
Torres may cause some confusion. The court uses the terms defense and affirmative defense
interchangeably in discussing involuntary intoxication. Id. at 748-50. Affirmative defense as
used in Torres does not refer to an affirmative defense as defined in section 2.04 of the
Texas Penal Code. Section 2.04 is a legislative designation applying only to defenses expressly labeled affirmative defenses in the Penal Code, and involuntary intoxication is not
even mentioned in the Penal Code. Thus, Torres should be interpreted as holding involuntary intoxication is a defensive issue that must be affirmatively raised by the defendant. See
Wilson v. State, 581 S.W.2d 661, 665, 668, 670-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (example of the
confusion that can result from indiscriminate use of the term affirmative defense).
57. 542 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
58. Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
59. Id. at 749. Unlike some other jurisdictions, the Texas court in Torres does not require a finding of insanity. Insanity, as defined in section 8.01(a) of the Texas Penal Code,
must be caused by a mental disease or defect. The Torres decision does require a degree of
mental dysfunction equivalent to insanity and adopts the same test to measure this degree
of mental dysfunction. Therefore, while a defendant claiming involuntary intoxication must
present evidence showing the required degree of mental dysfunction, he does not have to
show insanity which, as an affirmative defense in the Penal Code, requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Compare Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 748-49 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979) with City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 857 (Minn. 1976) and
State v. Mriglot, 550 P.2d 17, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
60. Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 748-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
61. Id. at 748.
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mind was minimal, it was found sufficient to have entitled her to a jury
charge on involuntary intoxication."
The holding in Torres creates a new criminal defense in Texas, but because the court's discussion was limited to the facts of the instant case,
the applicability of the defense to other fact situations is uncertain. s The
finding of involuntariness in Torres is based solely on the defendant's
lack of knowledge of the drug, and the court gives no indication of what
other circumstances might fit within the definition of involuntariness."4
Intoxication resulting from taking medically prescribed drugs will meet
the test if the individual had no knowledge of possible intoxicating side
effects of the drug, since independent judgment is exercised in taking the
drug as medicine, not as an intoxicant.6 5 Pathological intoxication does
not meet the Torres test for involuntariness."6 The intoxicant is taken
voluntarily with knowledge of its intoxicating property; only the increased
degree of intoxication is unexpected.6 7 Direct force presumably will suffice
to show involuntariness regardless of the defendant's knowledge of the
intoxicant since no independent judgment is exercised when an intoxicant
is forcibly introduced into a person's body." A threat of force, however,
will not necessarily show involuntariness if the test set out in Torres is
strictly followed. A person taking an intoxicant under threat of force exercises some independent judgment in deciding between taking the intoxicant or risking the threatened action. 69
62. Id. at 749. The only evidence was the victim's testimony the defendant appeared
drugged and police testimony that defendant was asleep in the victim's car when arrested.
Id. at 749.
63. Id. at 748-49.
64. Id. at 748.
65. See Perkins v. United States, 228 F. 408, 415-16 (4th Cir. 1915) (person is not presumed to know of possible intoxicating effects of drugs, but notice of such a possibility from
physician or drug label may be considered by the court in determining involuntariness); City
of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 856-57 (Minn. 1976) (if defendant knows, or has
reason to know, of prescription drug's intoxicating effect, intoxication is voluntary).
66. See Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The test requires
no independent judgment in taking the intoxicant. The key factor is knowledge that the
substance is an intoxicant, not knowledge of the degree of intoxication that may result from
its use. Id. at 748-49.
67. See, e.g., Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730, 736 (9th Cir. 1968) (defense would
require defendant not know of his susceptibility to grossly excessive degree of intoxication),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969); Martinez v. People, 235 P.2d 810, 815 (Colo. 1951)
("acute mental disturbance due to large and sometimes small amounts of alcohol"); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.08 (4)(a), (5)(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
68. See State v. Plummer, 374 A.2d 431, 435 (N.H. 1977); Johnson v. Commonwealth,
115 S.E. 673, 676 (Va. 1923). See generally J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
539-40 (2d ed. 1960).
69. See Burrows v. State, 297 P. 1029, 1035-36 (Ariz. 1931). In determining if threat of
force would ever constitute involuntariness, the definition of compulsion in the Texas Penal
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The Texas court, in determining the required mental state, followed
other jurisdictions recently addressing the issue of equating involuntary
intoxication with insanity."0 According to Torres the mental dysfunction
test should be the same for the involuntary intoxication defense and the
insanity defense." This direct adoption of the insanity mental dysfunction test for involuntary intoxication fails to reflect at least three important differences: the transitory nature of intoxication,7 2 the practical impossibility of using experts to show the requisite cause of the mental
dysfunction," and the post-acquittal disposition of defendants.7 ' These
differences justify a different test for involuntary intoxication, but a more
practical solution is to impose a lesser burden of proof on the defendant
75
claiming involuntary intoxication.

The difficulty of proving the necessary degree of mental dysfunction
will be greater for the defense of involuntary intoxication because both
the dysfunction and its cause are transitory." With an insanity defense,
the defendant's mental dysfunction may be temporary, but the mental
disease or defect causing it is unlikely to be of short duration. 7 A defenCode should prove helpful. Threat of force is compulsion only if such threat "would render
a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 8.05(c) (Vernon 1974); accord, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(b), Comment (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (corresponding language). The comments accompanying section 2.08 indicate the Model Penal Code's test for duress, which is similar to section 8.05(c) of the Texas
Penal Code, is also applicable for determining involuntary intoxication. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.08 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 895-96 (2d
ed. 1969).
70. See, e.g., State v. Bunn, 196 S.E.2d 777, 786 (N.C. 1973); State v. Mriglot, 550 P.2d
17, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976); Staples v. State, 245 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Wis. 1976).
71. Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The court stated there
were no reasons to differentiate the two defenses in terms of the level of mental dysfunction
sufficient to remove criminal responsibility; accordingly, the modified M'Naghten Rule of
section 8.01 was applied to the involuntary intoxication defense. Id. at 749; see TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 1974).
72. See, e.g., People v. King, 510 P.2d 333, 334-35 (Colo. 1973); People v. Spencer, 178
N.W.2d 130, 131-32 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Maik, 287 A.2d 715, 718-19 (N.J. 1972),
overruled on other grounds, State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 305 (N.J. 1975).
73. See, e.g., People v. Manier, 518 P.2d- 811, 814 (Colo. 1974); State v. Clark, 187
N.W.2d 717, 720-21 (Iowa 1971); St. Pe v. State, 495 S.W.2d 224, 225-26 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973).
74. See State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 146 (Me. 1977) (insanity requires civil commitment,
involuntary intoxication does not); City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 859-60
(Minn. 1976) (Rogosheske, J., concurring) (mental state caused by involuntary intoxication
not equivalent to insanity).
75. See State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 146 (Me. 1977).
76. See Martinez v. People, 235 P.2d 810, 814-17 (Colo. 1951); State v. Bunn, 196
S.E.2d 777, 785 (N.C. 1973).
77. See Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); McGee v. State,
155 Tex. 639, 643-44, 238 S.W.2d 707, 710-11 (1950).
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dant claiming insanity as a defense can be examined by expert witnesses
prior to trial for evidence of the required mental disease or defect and its
manifestations.78 Although lay testimony of witnesses to the criminal act
is competent to show mental dysfunction, expert testimony is a standard
method of proving insanity. 7 Examination of a defendant claiming involuntary intoxication is unlikely to be informative due to the transitory nature of the condition." Excepting some stronger hallucinogenic drugs,8 1
most intoxicants wear off in a few hours or a few days, and expert testimony will be limited to hypothetical questions.82 In Torres the only evidence available to show the defendant's mental state at the time of the
crime was the victim's testimony the defendant appeared drugged plus
the police testimony defendant was asleep in the victim's car when ar84
rested.8 s As the court stated, the evidence was meager.
Another difference between insanity and intoxication involves proving
the requisite cause of the mental dysfunction." Expert witnesses can testify a defendant had a mental defect or disease before and after the criminal act and about the likelihood it was the cause of the mental dysfunction at the time of the act.86 No similar expert testimony is available to a
defendant claiming intoxication. 7 Without corroborating witnesses, as in
Torres, to testify to the existence of an intoxicant and to the defendant's

78. See Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 950-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). See generally
TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 46.03, § 3(a) (Vernon 1979); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 40, at 304 (1972).
79. See Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1057 (1969); Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 950-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). In Graham
the court stated the insanity issue is not strictly medical but recognized the medical expert
does have a significant role in determining a defendant's sanity. Graham v. State, 566
S.W.2d 941, 949-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). See generally Huckabee, Resolving the Problem
of Dominance of Psychiatrists in Criminal Responsibility Decisions: A Proposal, 27 Sw.
L.J. 790 (1973).
80. See, e.g., Martinez v. People, 235 P.2d 810, 816-17 (Colo. 1951); Saldiveri v. State,
143 A.2d 70, 75-76 (Md. 1958); State v. Bunn, 196 S.E.2d 777, 784-85 (N.C. 1973).
81. See State v. Maik, 287 A.2d 715, 719 (N.J. 1972), overruled on other grounds, State
v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 305 (N.J. 1975).
82. See, e.g., People v. Murray, 56 Cal. Rptr. 21, 26°(Ct. App. 1967); State v. Seely, 510
P.2d 115, 118-19 (Kan. 1973); State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 148 (Me. 1977).
83. Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
84. Id. at 749.
85. Compare Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (insanity) with People v. Manier, 518 P.2d 811, 814 (Colo. 1974) (intoxication) and St. Pe v.
State, 495 S.W.2d 224, 225-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (intoxication).
86. See Kane v. United States, 399 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1057 (1969); Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 946-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); TEx. CoDE
CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 46.03, § 3(a) (Vernon 1979).
87. See People v. King, 510 P.2d 333, 335 (Colo. 1973); State v. Maik, 287 A.2d 715, 719
(N.J. 1972), overruled on other grounds, State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 305 (N.J. 1975).
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taking the intoxicant unknowingly, a defendant will have little chance of
producing evidence sufficient to raise a fact question for the jury.18
A third difference is the disposition of a defendant after a finding of
not guilty by reason of insanity or of involuntary intoxication. 8' Section
4(a) of article 46.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the
trial court, upon a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, to determine if there is evidence to support a finding the defendant is mentally ill
or mentally retarded.' If such evidence is found, the court must transfer
the defendant to the appropriate court for civil commitment proceedings."' There is no requirement for such a determination or for commitment proceedings after a finding of not guilty by reason of involuntary
intoxication; the defendant, when found not guilty, is freed at once.' 2 At
least one jurisdiction has recognized this distinction, " reasoning that the
severity of the consequences of a successful defense of insanity justified a
heavier burden of proof.'4 Insanity must be proved by a prepondernace of
the evidence, but involuntary intoxication need be raised only by reasonable doubt.'5
Involuntary intoxication is a new defense in Texas, and until additional
cases are decided the parameters of the defense must come from Torres."

A literal interpretation of the court's treatment of insanity and involuntary intoxication as analogous defenses and the court's use of the term

88. Compare State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 146-48 (Me. 1977) (corroboration) and City of
Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Minn. 1976) (corroboration) with People v.
Murray, 56 Cal. Rptr. 21, 23-25 (Ct. App. 1967) (no corroboration) and Commonwealth v.
McAlister, 313 N.E.2d 113, 119 (Mass. 1974) (no corroboration).
89. See State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 146 (Me. 1977) (court found crucial difference in
consequences of exoneration). See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 36, at
269-70, § 40, at 304-05 (1972). See also TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 46.03, § 4(a)
(Vernon 1979).
90. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 46.03, § 4(a) (Vernon 1979).
91. Id. The court may also order the defendant kept in custody until the civil commitment proceedings. Id.
92. See State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 146 (Me. 1977). Article 46.03 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure relates only to the insanity defense. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art.
46.03 (Vernon 1979).
93. See State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 146 (Me. 1977).
94. Id. at 146.
95. Id. at 146. A majority of jurisdictions require defendants to raise only a reasonable
doubt to establish an insanity defense. See, e.g., State v. Schantz, 403 P.2d 521, 525 (Ariz.
1965); State v. Moeller, 433 P.2d 136, 143 (Hawaii 1967); Commonwealth v. McHoul, 226
N.E.2d 556, 558 (Mass. 1967). If the Texas courts want to equate insanity and involuntary
intoxication, they should follow the majority rule rather than the Texas insanity statute.
See generally Hester, Law in Evolution - Chapter8 of the Texas New Penal Code, 37 TEx.
B.J. 1065, 1067 (1974).
96. See Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (no independent
judgment and mental state equivalent to insanity).
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